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1ABstrAct
Increasing copyright infringement and 
high litigation costs have left many independent 
content producers without the means to effectively 
commercialize their creations.  However, this problem 
can be solved with inspiration from the patent world, 
where non-practicing entities (NPEs) have, among 
other things, given independent inventors additional 
options for commercializing their inventions.  If 
adopted by the copyright world, an NPE would 
also provide more enforcement options to creators 
of copyrighted material, but would best do so by 
selling copyright insurance.  This would allow it 
to legally pursue infringers on behalf of its insured 
clients, and give clients maximum control over their 
content.  This system will eliminate rampant copyright 
infringement while simultaneously opening new 
markets for insurance providers, increasing the value of 
copyrighted works, and making copyright enforcement 
more efficient. 
 
IntroductIon
Matthew Inman runs an online cartoon called 
“The Oatmeal.”2  His business model is simple: he 
draws cartoons and monetizes them via merchandising 
and ad revenue.3  In early 2010, though, Inman learned 
that a content aggregator,4 funnyjunk.com, was 
displaying hundreds of copies of his work,5 without 
1.  Candidate, M.S., Intellectual Property Management and 
Markets at the Illinois Institute of Technology.  Thanks to Professor 
Edward Lee, Professor David Schwartz, and Grant Schakelford 
for their teaching, guidance, and coaching throughout the writing 
process.  Thanks also to my brother, Bob McAlpine, for providing 
the inspiration for this article.  
2.  Matthew Inman, About the Oatmeal, the oAtmeAL, http://
theoatmeal.com/pages/about (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).  
3.  Danny Bradbury, The Oatmeal beat Funnyjunk, but other 
cartoonists aren’t so lucky, guArdIAn (June 21, 2012, 1:55 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/21/oatmeal-
carreon-comics-property.  
4.  A content aggregator is a website that does not produce any 
content, but rather assembles content from other sources into one 
place.  
5.  Matthew Inman, What should I do about FunnyJunk.com, 
the oAtmeAL, http://theoatmeal.com/blog/funnyjunk (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013).    
link-backs or attribution.  Accordingly, he requested the 
site’s administrator remove the infringing copies via a 
DMCA takedown notice.6  
After fruitlessly sending these requests 
for a year,7 Inman grew frustrated with the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) process, and 
resorted to the power of the press to protect his 
intellectual property.8  He wrote two blog-posts on his 
website9 ranting about his stolen comics, and then let 
the issue rest.10  One year later, though, he received a 
letter from FunnyJunk’s attorney, demanding him to 
remove his posts about FunnyJunk and to pay twenty-
thousand dollars for alleged defamation and false 
advertising.11  In the following weeks, Inman retaliated 
with more blog posts and then raised more than ten 
times the requested amount, which he donated to 
charity to spite FunnyJunk.12  He also sent FunnyJunk’s 
attorney a drawing of his mother attempting to seduce 
a bear, along with several pictures of the charity 
money.13  FunnyJunk then sued Inman for trademark 
infringement and inciting others to cyber-vandalism.14  
After some brief legal foot-stepping, FunnyJunk 
ultimately honored Inman’s original request by 
blocking its users from accessing his content and it then 
dismissed its lawsuit.15  
6.  Id.  
7.  Id.  
8.  Id.
9.  Id.  
10.  Id.  
11.  Dan Mitchell, Bear Seduction and the Copyright 
Conundrum, sFweekLY BLogs (June 12, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://
blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2012/06/bear_seduction_and_the_
copyrig.php.  
12.  Matthew Inman, FunnyJunk is threatening to file a federal 
lawsuit against me unless I pay $20,000 in damages, the oAtmeAL, 
http://theoatmeal.com/blog/funnyjunk_letter (last visited Feb. 21, 
2012).  
13.  Matthew Inman, As promised, here’s the photo of 
$211,223.04 in cash we raised for charity, the oAtmeAL, http://
theoatmeal.com/blog/charity_money (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).  
14.  Complaint at 1, Carreon v. Inman, No. 12-CV-03112 (N.D. 
Cal., June 15, 2012).  
15.  Michael Cavna, ‘The Oatmeal’ v. FunnyJunk Lawyer: Why 
Charles Carreon dropped his Indiegogo charity lawsuit, wAsh. 
Post BLog (July 6, 2012, 12:43 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/the-oatmeal-v-funnyjunk-lawyer-why-
charles-carreon-dropped-his-indiegogo-charity-lawsuit/2012/07/06/
gJQAND0pQW_blog.html. 
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While few could have predicted that a simple 
copyright dispute would escalate to such comical 
proportions, the story nonetheless illustrates a 
salient issue in modern copyright enforcement.  The 
Internet allows individuals to engage in mass copying 
and redistribution with only a few mouse-clicks, 
while owners of copyright-protected material lack 
comparable countermeasures.  For example, copyright 
owners bear the burden of identifying and policing 
infringers,16 but most are unable to afford the cost of 
enforcing their rights against these copiers.17  Under the 
current system, a mass infringer operates at little cost, 
while the copyright owner must spend a substantial 
sum to protect his rights.18  While copyright protection 
may be considered just another cost of doing business 
for large organizations such as Disney or Universal, 
the expense of litigation is often an insurmountable 
obstacle to an individual whose rights have been 
violated.19  
A similar situation exists in patent law.  
There, while the cost of enforcement remains high, a 
solution has evolved that allows patent owners to more 
efficiently and effectively protect their property.  The 
non-practicing entity (NPE) is an organization that does 
not seek to sell patented products, but rather specializes 
in licensing and enforcing patents.20  Accordingly, 
they have dramatically changed the landscape of 
patent law, albeit with a great deal of controversy, by 
providing independent inventors with an additional 
source of capital, and with cheaper and more effective 
enforcement options.21  
With only minor changes, the copyright world 
could adopt a similar model, whereby owners rely on 
third-parties to enforce their intellectual property rights. 
These copyright-based NPEs would fill a growing void 
by providing copyright owners with an effective and 
affordable mechanism for protecting their property, and 
in the process give owners the ability to realize more 
value from their property and more ways to protect it.  
This Note proposes using NPEs in copyright 
law to solve the problem of mass online copyright 
infringement.  Part I begins with an overview of 
copyright infringement both before and after the 
16.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).  
17.  Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop., of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45–46 (2006) [Copyright 
Claims Hearing] (statement of the United States Copyright Office).  
18.  Id. at 45–47.
19.  Id.  
20.  See infra section I.C. 
21.  Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths Exposed, InteLL. Asset 
mgmt. mAg., July/Aug. 2012, at 74.  
Internet became the primary method of content 
distribution, and highlights the changes in business 
structure that have altered the copyright enforcement 
paradigm.  It next discusses Righthaven’s failed 
attempt to become a copyright NPE and the lessons 
that potential followers can learn from that company’s 
experiment.  Finally, the section ends with an analysis 
of the impact of NPEs on patent law, and notes that 
copyright law could benefit from the alternative 
enforcement mechanisms these organizations provide.  
In Part II, this Note proposes introducing NPEs 
into the copyright world in order to achieve more 
affordable and effective copyright enforcement.  This 
section explains that, unlike patent NPEs that own their 
intellectual property outright, a copyright NPE will be 
most effective by insuring the copyrights of others and 
using the doctrine of subrogation to enforce its client’s 
rights against infringers.  It then explains the basic 
mechanics of how such an organization would work, 
and then discusses the benefits that these organizations 
would give to society.  
Part III addresses the potential criticisms 
of this proposal.  Specifically, it explains how the 
fair use doctrine will not prevent copyright insurers 
from operating profitably.  It also addresses concerns 
that copyright insurers will use their power to bully 
infringers into unfair settlements.  Finally, it explains 
how copyright insurers will not adversely affect fair 
users or free speech.
 
I. coPYrIght owners need new    
 enForcement mechAnIsms
Over the past several decades, advances in 
technology have given copyright owners new and 
powerful ways to monetize their creations.22  The 
Internet and, specifically, social networks allow owners 
to distribute their works to increasingly larger markets 
and to exercise greater control over how their property 
is used.  However, the Internet also allows individuals 
to copy, redistribute, and pirate on a massive scale 
and in ways that the law cannot yet effectively 
control.23  Accordingly, copyright owners cannot rely 
22.  Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: 
The Art Act, The Net Act and Illegal Streaming: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, and the Internet H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 16 (Mar. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Maria A. Pallante, 
Register of Copyrights).  
23.  The “Stop Online Piracy Act”: Hearing on H.R. 3261 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (Nov. 16, 
2011) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).
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on traditional copyright enforcement mechanisms.24  
Rather, they need new tools to protect their property 
against the new threats of the online world.
 
A. The Problem of Copyright 
Infringement
In recent Congressional testimony, Maria 
Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, articulated the 
problem of mass copyright infringement, saying: 
[W]hen infringers blatantly 
distribute, stream, and otherwise 
disseminate copyrighted works 
on the Internet, they often do so 
because they have no expectation 
of enforcement.  Unfortunately, 
the more these kinds of actions go 
unchecked, the less appealing the 
Internet will be for creators of and 
investors in legitimate content. In 
other words, Internet piracy not 
only usurps the copyright value 
chain for any one work, it also 
threatens the rule of copyright law 
in the 21st century.25  
Unlike in the pre-Internet world, today anyone with 
a computer can create and distribute content, and 
anyone with a computer can infringe and pirate 
content.  Because the Internet has so fundamentally 
altered the way individuals create, distribute, and 
consume content,26 the law protecting that content must 
fundamentally change as well.  As Ms. Pallante noted, 
without a change to provide adequate enforcement 
mechanisms, many creators will simply stop creating.27  
1. Traditional Copyright Enforcement 
Mechanisms
Before home recording technology became 
widely available in the 1990s, most content 
was created, produced, and distributed by large 
organizations.  For example, to professionally 
produce a music album, a record company must pay 
for recording, editing, marketing, and distributing.28  
24.  Id.
25.  Id. at 2.  
26.  Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 16.
27.  Id. at 2.
28.  record IndustrY AssocIAtIon oF AmerIcA, Let’s PLAY: the 
AmerIcAn musIc BusIness 6 (2010).  
Because trained professionals perform these functions, 
and because the final product shipped to market 
is a tangible good, the costs are incredibly high.29  
Accordingly, large-scale content production was an 
enterprise in which only large organizations could 
operate.  
Further, the enforcement system envisioned by 
copyright law was appropriate for such organizations.  
Because the law allows a copyright owner to sue when 
her work is infringed, simple business sense dictates 
that the work in question must be at least be as valuable 
as the cost of the litigation to protect it,30 or that the 
owner must have a sufficiently good chance of winning 
the suit and recouping his costs.31  Further, the high cost 
of bringing creative works to market would require the 
work to be at least as valuable as the cost of creating 
and distributing it.32  Combined with the fact that these 
works were commercialized by large organizations, the 
ability to use the court system to protect a copyright 
was an appropriate enforcement mechanism.  Large 
organizations were willing to incur the expense of 
protecting their works through litigation because they 
only invested in a product that was worth at least the 
cost of commercialization and defense.   
While traditional litigation was an adequate 
remedy for large organizations, the fair use doctrine33 
provided a mechanism for individuals and smaller 
entities to use copyrighted material without fear of 
legal retribution by the larger and more powerful 
organizations.  Under traditional enforcement 
models, this doctrine worked well because it helped 
normalize the unequal power relationship between 
large and small entities.  Further, the doctrine tacitly 
recognized that, because of the massive differences 
between the large organization and individual copier, 
the individual’s copying was unlikely to cause harm 
to the organization’s product.  Indeed, when content 
29.  Id. at 3, 6. 
30.  No rational person would spend $30,000 to protect a 
copyright only worth $20,000.   
31.  17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).  
32.  A business would not sell a product for ten dollars if it cost 
them fifteen dollars to produce it.  
33.  The fair use doctrine allows unauthorized use of 
copyrighted materials under certain conditions.  17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an 
infringement of copyright.  In determining whether the use made 
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.”).
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production was a capital-intensive industry, logic 
dictated that only a well-funded entity could cause 
significant damage through infringement.
2. The Internet and Mass Copyright 
Infringement
While copyright enforcement mechanisms 
were effective in the world of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
the Internet has fundamentally altered the business 
of content production.34  Unlike the example in the 
previous section, producing and distributing a music 
album today requires only a microphone, basic 
recording software, and an Internet connection.  The 
world of content production is no longer capital-
intensive and dominated by large entities.35  Rather, 
organizations such as the New York Times and NBC 
operate on a distribution model similar to that of the 
average blogger: they post content to their websites 
and rely on advertising revenue to make a profit.36  
Accordingly, content is cheaper to produce and cheaper 
to infringe.  The result is that more individuals are 
producing and distributing their own content, but 
do not have effective or affordable tools to fight 
infringement.37  
While online content distribution is 
extremely cheap, protecting that content is impossibly 
expensive.38  First, copyright owners bear the burden 
of policing their own work.39  When they find 
unauthorized copying online, they must ask the website 
administrator to remove the offending material, and the 
owner can only sue for infringement if the work is not 
removed “expeditiously.”40  When the work is widely 
copied, this process can become incredibly time-
consuming and lead to high opportunity costs.  In the 
words of Matthew Inman, “trying to police copyright 
infringement on the Internet is like strolling into the 
Vietnamese jungle circa 1964 and politely asking 
34.  Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 16.
35.  Justin Bachman, The Big Record Labels’ Not-So-Big 
Future, Bus. wk. (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.businessweek.
com/stories/2007-10-10/the-big-record-labels-not-so-big-
futurebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
advice.  
36.  Eriq Gardner, The Righthaven Experiment: A Journalist 
Wonders if the Copyright Troll Who Sued Him was Somehow . . . 
Right?, A.B.A. J., May 2012, at 36.  
37.  See Am. InteLL. ProP. LAw Ass’n, rePort oF the economIc 
surveY 2011, at 35 (stating the median cost of copyright litigation 
for disputes with less than $1,000,000 at risk was $200,000 in 
2011).
38.  Id.  
39.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).  
40.  Id.  
everyone to use squirt guns.”41  Second, most content 
creators today do not have the resources to protect their 
property through litigation.42  Even if they did, few 
copyright owners would be willing to spend thousands 
of dollars in court costs and attorney’s fees to recover 
only a fraction of their costs in a damage award.  The 
result is that many copyright owners have been “left . . 
. to compete with thieves.”43  
Indeed, most infringers know that they are 
unlikely to face the consequences of their actions 
because enforcement is too expensive.  Because there 
is rarely a credible threat of litigation, and because 
infringing costs even less than creating, they are able to 
make a profit at the expense of content producers.44  For 
example, infringers use unauthorized works to generate 
ad revenue on their sites.45  They simultaneously divert 
traffic from the work’s original source, which decreases 
the owner’s ad revenue.46  Accordingly, a content 
producer may invest substantial energy in distributing 
his work online, only to be left remediless against the 
destructive effects of a few mouse-clicks.  The infringer 
contributes nothing new to society and prospers at the 
producer’s expense, who, because of mass copyright 
infringement, has increasingly fewer incentives to 
invest resources into creating new works.
  
B. Copyright Enforcement and 
Righthaven
Recognizing the problem of mass online 
copyright infringement, a company called Righthaven 
began a doomed attempt at third-party copyright 
enforcement in 2010.47  It was built on a simple model: 
acquire limited rights to copyrighted material and then 
aggressively pursue infringers.48  While its experiment 
ultimately ended in failure, the lessons learned were 
not in vain.  Despite some legal technicalities that 
ultimately proved to be fatal, Righthaven demonstrated 
that a third-party copyright enforcement entity has the 
potential to be effective, profitable, and beneficial to its 
clients. 
41.  Inman, supra note 5.  
42.  See Copyright Claims Hearing, supra note 17.  
43.  Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 1.  
44.  Id.  
45.  Id.  
46.  Id.  
47.  Steve Green, Legal attack dog sicked on websites accused 
of violating R-J copyrights, LAs vegAs sun (Aug. 4, 2010, 2:00 
AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/aug/04/unlikely-
targets-emerging-war-media-content/.  
48.  Id.  
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1. Righthaven’s Business Model
Righthaven sought to provide copyright 
enforcement services to content producers, specifically 
newspaper publishers.49  It entered into agreements 
with several media companies in which it acquired 
limited rights to their copyright portfolios in return for 
a share in the proceeds of any litigation it won based on 
those copyrights.50  These agreements gave Righthaven 
“all copyrights requisite to have Righthaven recognized 
as the copyright owner of the work for purposes of 
Righthaven being able to claim ownership,”51 and 
limited Righthaven’s ability to exploit the copyrights to 
merely suing for infringement.52  Further, Righthaven 
was obligated to reassign its interest in the copyrights 
to their owners if it did not pursue litigation within a 
specified time period.53  
Once Righthaven acquired these rights, it 
identified infringers, who were always individuals 
or small organizations, and demanded them to pay a 
settlement fee or face litigation.54  It used aggressive 
tactics and the threat of costly litigation to induce most 
to quickly negotiate and pay the settlement fee.55  When 
an infringer refused to negotiate a payment and opted 
to defend its activity in court, Righthaven asked for 
the defendant’s domain name to be forfeited as part of 
the judgment.56  In short, Righthaven’s strategy was 
to use its legal muscle to quickly and cheaply secure 
settlement payments from parties that lacked resources 
to defend themselves, and to spend time and money in 
court only when absolutely necessary. 
 
2. Why Righthaven Failed
Despite its aggressive tactics, Righthaven 
went defunct less than two years after it was founded.57  
Because many of the people it sued were sympathetic 
49.  Gardner, supra note 36, at 37.  
50.  Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142 
(D. Nev. 2011).  
51.  Id. at 1143.  
52.  Id. at 1142.  
53.  Id. at 1145.  
54.  Green, supra note 47.
55.  Steve Green, About Righthaven, vegAs Inc (Nov. 29, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2010/nov/29/
about-righthaven.  
56.  Steve Green, Judge Strikes Righthaven Website Domain 
Demand, vegAs Inc (Apr. 16, 2011, 2:05 AM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2011/apr/16/judge-strikes-righthaven-website-
domain-demand. 
57.  Steve Green, Righthaven Receiver Moves to Fire CEO 
Steven Gibson, LAw vegAs sun (June 25, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://
www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/jun/25/righthaven-receiver-moves-
fire-ceo-steven-gibson.  
defendants and protected by the fair use doctrine,58 
and because the courts determined that it did not have 
standing to sue for copyright infringement, Righthaven 
lost every case it litigated.59  Accordingly, the 
company’s assets were turned over to a court-appointed 
receiver, and its founder is now under investigation by 
the Nevada State Bar.60  
First, Righthaven’s business model was 
flawed because it only sought to enforce copyrights 
against infringers who were likely to give in to 
settlement demands.61  Because individuals and small 
organizations typically do not have the resources or 
desire to fight lengthy court battles, Righthaven was 
able to use the specter of litigation to strong-arm these 
parties into modest settlement agreements.62  However, 
while this strategy may have looked good on paper; it 
backfired in practice.  While most infringers quickly 
settled, some did not.  In those cases that were heard 
in court, judges ruled in favor of the defendants.63  
Furthermore, as some defendants increasingly won 
cases against Righthaven, others became less likely to 
settle infringement claims, and more likely to litigate.  
Consequently, Righthaven spent more money in court 
than it was prepared to and cquired a reputation as 
a copyright “troll” out to make easy money at the 
expense of defenseless individuals, both in and out of 
court.  Accordingly, courts grew less sympathetic to 
Righthaven’s complaints and more favorable towards 
the defendants.  
Second, Righthaven’s business model was 
flawed because it failed to identify which infringers 
were protected by the fair use doctrine and which 
were not.  In many of these cases, the court found 
that although the defendants had engaged in unlawful 
copying, their use of the material was a fair use and 
therefore not an infringement.64  For example, in 
58.  Id.  
59.  See generally Comprehensive List of Copyright 
Infringement Lawsuits Filed by Righthaven, LLC, rIghthAven 
LAwsuIts (last visited Apr. 20, 2013), http://righthavenlawsuits.
com/lawsuits.html (listing of every Righthaven lawsuit and its 
disposition).  
60.  Steve Green, Three Attorneys Face Righthaven Inquiry 
by State Bar, vegAs Inc (Jan. 12, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2012/jan/12/three-attorneys-face-righthaven-
inquiry-state-bar. 
61.  Green, supra note 47.  
62.  Id.  
63.  Steve Green, Righthaven Ordered to Pay Attorney’s Fees 
in Another Case, vegAs Inc (June 14, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2012/jun/14/righthaven-ordered-pay-attorneys-
fees-another-case.  
64.  See Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, No. 2:10-CV-
1036 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010); Righthaven LLC v. Klerks, No. 2:10-
CV-00741 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010).  
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Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn,65 the court found that 
although the defendant had copied and re-posted an 
entire copyrighted newspaper article, his use was a 
fair use.66  Righthaven lost money in litigation and in 
settlement potential because it was unable to determine 
which infringers were fair users.67  Furthermore, 
because Righthaven sued many fair use defendants, its 
image suffered even more, and in addition to pursuing 
ill-equipped defendants, it also harassed individuals for 
their legitimate use of copyrighted material.68  
Third, and finally, the most serious flaw 
with Righthaven’s business model was that the 
company never acquired standing to sue for copyright 
infringement.69  Federal statute dictates that the legal 
or beneficial owner of one of the six exclusive rights 
under a copyright the right to sue for infringement.  
As interpreted by the courts, this provision requires a 
plaintiff to own one of the exclusive rights enumerated 
in the Copyright Act.70  For example, in Silvers v. Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,71 the court found that 
the plaintiff did not have standing to sue for copyright 
infringement because she had only acquired the bare 
right to sue for infringement.72  
When Righthaven acquired an interest in 
Stephens Media’s copyright portfolio, it gained “all 
copyrights requisite to have Righthaven recognized 
as the copyright owner of the Work for purposes of 
Righthaven being able to claim ownership as well as 
the right to seek redress for past, present and future 
65.  792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 2011).
66.  Id. at 1150.
67.  Green, supra note 63.  
68.  Nate Anderson, Class-action lawsuit targets Righthaven’s 
“extortion litigation”, Ars technIcA (May 18, 2011, 12:57 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/05/class-action-lawsuit-
targets-righthavens-extortion-litigation. 
69.  Righthaven, LLC v. Democratic Underground, 791 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D. Nev. 2011).  
70.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any 
of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon 
the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords 
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of 
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted 
work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”).
71.  Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th 
Cir. 2005).  
72.  Id.  
infringements of the copyright, both accrued and un-
accrued, in and to the Work.”73  The court found that 
this agreement did not give Righthaven ownership 
over any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, and 
Righthaven therefore did not have standing to bring 
the suit.74  Accordingly, all of the 276 cases Righthaven 
brought were dismissed, and Righthaven was often 
ordered to pay the defendant’s litigation costs.75  
Furthermore, after Righthaven accrued over 
$300,000.00 in attorney’s fees owed to its opponents,76 
a federal judge ordered all of the company’s tangible 
and intangible assets delivered to a court-appointed 
receiver, which was sold to satisfy its debts.77  Although 
the company still has two cases pending in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, it is essentially defunct.78  
Righthaven’s attempt to provide an alternate copyright 
enforcement mechanism was a colossal failure.  
However, this failure is a valuable lesson for future 
attempts at alternative enforcement: a third-party 
copyright enforcer must overcome the hurdles of fair 
use and standing in order to be effective and profitable.
  
C. Lessons in Third-Party Enforcement 
from Patent Law
In patent law, organizations known as NPEs 
operate on a business model similar to Righthaven’s.  
However, unlike Righthaven, NPEs have been 
enormously successful and have had a profound 
effect on the landscape of patent law.79  In addition to 
acquiring rights to patents and then suing infringers, 
they seek to build revenue streams by licensing their 
patents to others.80  Accordingly, NPEs in patent law 
have provided an effective and affordable solution to 
the problem of expensive litigation.  Due to the many 
similarities between patent law and copyright law, it 
seems appropriate to look to these entities for answers 
to the problem of inaccessible copyright enforcement.  
73.  Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (D. 
Nev. 2011).
74.  Id.  
75.  See Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 
(D. Nev. 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Eiser, No. 2:10-CV-3075, 
(D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2012).    
76.  Green, supra note 63.  
77.  Steve Green, Judge Strips Righthaven of Rights to 278 
Copyrights and its Trademark, vegAs Inc (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:29 
PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/mar/05/judge-strips-
righthaven-rights-278-copyrights-and-/.  
78.  Id.
79.  Id.
80.  Joff Wild, A War by Any Other Name, InteLL. Asset 
mgmt., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 4.  
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1. The Structure of a Non-Practicing 
Entity in Patent Law
Large NPEs operate on one of two models.  
Organizations such as Acacia Technologies work 
by acquiring patents, licensing the use rights to 
those patents, and suing infringers.81  Conversely, 
organizations such as RPX Corporation are known as 
defensive patent aggregators (DPAs).82  These NPEs 
work by building patent portfolios and licensing 
them for defensive use, essentially providing risk 
management services via a pool of patents that its 
clients may use to defend themselves from litigation.83  
Under the first model, NPEs provide a 
clearing-house function: they identify valuable patents, 
acquire them, and then assert them through licensing 
negotiations or litigation.  Companies use these types 
of NPEs as a cheap alternative to in-house research and 
development: the NPE has already located and acquired 
the needed technology and is usually able to provide 
it for less than the cost of research and development.  
Once a license is agreed upon, the company is able 
to start producing its product immediately.  This 
arrangement is similar to a common cross-licensing 
deal,84 except that it is one-sided, which makes the 
whole process more efficient.  
Under the second model, NPEs provide risk 
management services in the form of patent protection.  
Here, an NPE aggregates a large pool of patents that 
its clients can use to defend against infringement 
suits.  Although some commentators, and even some 
DPAs, claim that this business model provides strategic 
defense against “trolling” behavior, Jiaqing Lu points 
out that both models are necessary in today’s patent 
ecosystem.85  Under his theory, both varieties of NPEs 
81.  Profile, AcAcIA, http://acaciatechnologies.com/
aboutus_main.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (“Acacia Research 
Corporation’s subsidiaries partner with inventors and patent owners, 
license the patents to corporate users, and share the revenue.  Our 
partners are primarily individual inventors and small companies 
with limited resources to deal with unauthorized users but include 
some large companies wanting to generate revenues from their 
patented technologies.”).  
82.  rPx, http://www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) 
(“Every member of our client network receives a license to every 
patent and patent right we own.”).    
83.  Id. (“RPX helps corporations manage their exposure to 
patent risk by providing a rational alternative to traditional litigation 
strategy.  Our solution offers a market-based solution in which we 
proactively acquire high-risk patents before they can become a 
costly legal problem for our clients.”).    
84.  BLAck’s LAw dIctIonArY 1003 (9th ed. 2009) (“An 
agreement between two or more patentees to exchange licenses for 
their mutual benefit and use of the licensed product.”).   
85.  Jiaqing Lu, The Economics and Controversies of 
Nonpracticing Entities (NPEs): How NPEs and Defensive Patent 
complement each other by providing unique services to 
the market. 
 
2. The Judicial Response to Non-
practicing Entities
Although U.S. courts have yet to address 
whether patent law should treat NPEs differently 
than other patent users, several courts have heard 
infringement cases in which NPEs have been principle 
players.  For example, in eBay v. MercExchange, 
LLC,86 the Supreme Court considered whether an 
injunction should automatically issue against a party 
liable of patent infringement.87  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Thomas rejected the appellate court’s view that 
a party’s “‘lack of commercial activity in practicing 
the patents’ would be sufficient to establish that the 
patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if 
an injunction did not issue.”88  He noted instead that 
“some patent holders, such as university researchers 
or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to 
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to 
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to 
market themselves.”89  However, Justice Kennedy, in a 
concurring opinion, argued that a court should consider 
“the economic function of the patent holder.”  Justice 
Kennedy noted that for NPEs, “an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, 
can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses 
to practice the patent.”90 
Further, in z4 Technologies v. Microsoft,91 the 
district court for the Eastern District of Texas denied 
z4’s request to enjoin Microsoft’s infringing use of 
its software patent.92  In this case, z4 argued that it 
had made a significant effort to commercialize its 
patents, and that Microsoft’s continuing infringement 
would limit its ability to sell its product.93  Because 
Microsoft and z4 were not direct competitors, the court 
found that z4 would not be irreparably harmed by the 
infringement, and that monetary damages were an 
Aggregators will Change the License Market, Part II, 48 Les 
nouveLLes 147, 151 (2012).  
86.  547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
87.  Id.  
88.  Id. at 393 (quoting Mercexchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc., 
275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003)).  
89.  Id.  
90.  Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
91.  434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
92.  Id. at 438.
93.  Id. at 440.
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adequate award.94  Essentially, it said that Microsoft’s 
use would not dissuade others from purchasing z4’s 
software because it only used the software in its own 
products.  However, the court overlooked the harm that 
Microsoft’s continuing use would inflict on z4’s ability 
to license its software.  
For NPEs, the implications of this decision 
are dire: if a judge can deny an injunction in part 
because the parties are not competitors, NPEs will 
always operate at a disadvantage.  Because infringers 
will be less likely to be enjoined when sued by an 
NPE rather than by a direct competitor, they will be 
more likely to litigate claims brought by NPEs, and 
NPEs will accordingly have to accept lower licensing 
fees.  Although the law has yet to speak directly to the 
issues presented by NPEs, it seems far from reaching a 
consensus.
  
3. The Impact of Non-Practicing Entities 
in Patent Law
As seen in eBay v. MercExchange, NPEs have 
both friends and enemies.95  Supporters argue that 
NPEs benefit the patent system by lowering transaction 
costs, which makes the patent market more efficient,96 
giving individual inventors a more efficient way to 
enforce their rights,97 and providing an additional 
source of capital to individual inventors and startup 
companies.98  However, their opponents argue that 
NPEs are ruining the patent system because they use 
low-value patents to extort large licensing fees from 
productive companies,99 try to maximize their profits by 
waiting for an industry to develop before asserting their 
patents,100 and freeload off of the patent system without 
contributing anything in return.101  
However, a recent empirical study by Michael 
Risch shows that most of these arguments have no 
factual support.  In fact, his data revealed that NPEs 
have had a significant impact on patent law in only two 
ways: they help individual inventors enforce claims 
94.  Id. at 444.
95.  See Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay 
v. MercExchange Enough?, 14 J. InteLL. ProP. L. 333 (2007); 
Sannu Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of 
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 coLum. L. rev. 114 (2010).  
96.  James McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea 
Economy, 56 emorY L. J. 189, 211 (2006).  
97.  Risch, supra note 21, at 74.
98.  Shrestha, supra note 95, at 150.  
99.  Myers, supra note 95, at 354.  
100.  Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 texAs L. rev. 1991, 1995 (2007).  
101.  Wild, supra note 80, at 4.  
against large entities, and provide additional sources 
of capital to individual inventors trying to license their 
patents.102  Risch found that 29% of patents enforced 
by NPEs were acquired from individual inventors,103 
and that they enforced twice as many individual 
inventor patents as a random sampling of other litigated 
patents.104  Furthermore, he found that because NPEs 
are able to pursue high-stakes patent litigation,105 and 
because they have greater bargaining power with which 
to negotiate settlement deals,106 they are often the 
individual inventor’s only viable option for protecting 
his rights.   
Risch’s study shows that, while NPEs are 
active and visible, they operate under the same 
parameters as productive entities.  Rather than being 
freeloaders, rent-seekers, or trolls, they have most 
noticeably impacted patent law by providing effective 
and affordable enforcement mechanisms to individual 
inventors.  Accordingly, NPEs have shown that third-
party enforcement is a viable solution to the problem of 
high litigation and enforcement costs.  
4. What can Copyright Law Learn from 
Patent NPEs?
NPEs in patent law have most dramatically 
benefitted individual inventors via enhanced 
enforcement and licensing opportunities.107  In addition, 
they provide defense, risk management, and research 
and development services to larger clients.108  Of these 
services, copyright owners could benefit most from 
better enforcement and risk management, and a third-
party copyright enforcer, or copyright NPE, should 
look to patent NPEs for guidance in these areas.  
Patent NPEs are able to help individual 
inventors protect their works because they are better 
situated to use the legal system to enforce their 
rights.109  Accordingly, a copyright NPE must be able 
to prosecute claims of infringement against even the 
most sophisticated infringers, and must have sufficient 
bargaining power to negotiate settlement agreements 
with large infringers.  Ultimately, the copyright 
NPE must have a revenue stream that enables it to 
102.  Id.
103.  Id.
104.  Id.
105.  Id.
106.  Id.
107.  Risch, supra note 21  
108.  See discussion supra notes 80–81.  
109.  Risch, supra note 21, at 74. (“NPE litigation may be 
the best way for garage inventors to capitalize on their patents if 
infringers refuse to license.”).    
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aggressively assert its rights.  
Furthermore, patent users also benefit from the 
risk management services provided by defensive patent 
aggregators.  With a large pool of patents available for 
licensing, the NPE has a reliable revenue source, and 
its clients essentially have insurance against the risk of 
being sued for infringement.  A copyright NPE should 
adopt this model with some slight modifications.  It 
could aggregate a large pool of copyrights, and use the 
fees generated by its clients to pursue infringers, rather 
than to defend against claims of infringement. 
NPEs have been successful in patent law, 
and a copyright NPE should seek to emulate their 
successes.  When looking to patent NPEs for solutions 
to the problem of high enforcement costs in copyright 
law, a would-be copyright NPE will find that the 
benefits of third-party enforcement accrue primarily to 
individual actors and small entities, and should target 
its efforts accordingly.  Just as there are a variety of 
NPEs in patent law, the fact that there are also a variety 
of content creators in copyright law indicates that a 
similar variety of NPEs should exist here as well.
  
II. coPYrIght LAw shouLd encourAge the   
 deveLoPment oF nPes
Copyright law will benefit from NPEs in many 
ways that patent law has benefited from NPEs.  Just as 
patent NPEs provide additional sources of capital to 
independent inventors and add credibility to any claims 
of infringement,110 copyright NPEs will also benefit 
content producers in similar ways.  Furthermore, as 
there are different business models for patent NPEs, so 
too will there be multiple business models for copyright 
NPEs.  
Depending on its clientele, a copyright NPE 
may not be able to effectively operate by owning 
copyrights outright.  Where producers such as 
musicians and dancers operate by both creating and 
performing their works, such a system would take too 
much control from them and greatly decrease their 
ability to profit from their property.  Here, the most 
efficient method of third-party copyright enforcement 
will be through a copyright insurance system.  Under 
this system, content producers will be able to insure 
their works against infringement, and insurance 
providers will be able to pursue infringers in the 
110.  Id.  
court system via the doctrine of subrogation.  Content 
producers will always receive compensation for harm 
caused by infringers, and insurance providers will, in 
addition to collecting premiums for their services, be 
able to use the legal system to pursue infringers. 
A. Copyright Insurance is the Best Third-
Party Enforcement Mechanism
Patent NPEs benefit society primarily by 
providing an additional source of capital to independent 
inventors, and by providing them with enforcement 
services against larger entities that often infringe with 
impunity.111  In copyright law, an NPE would provide 
these same services, although by different mechanisms. 
By providing insurance for copyright infringement, 
a copyright NPE would be able to pursue infringers, 
while insuring that individual copyright owners are 
compensated for their harm.
  
1. Copyright Insurance for Content 
Creators
A copyright insurance regime is the most 
effective mechanism for a copyright NPE to operate 
under because it will provide the NPE a steady income 
flow while simultaneously giving the owner more 
effective and affordable enforcement options.  This 
insurance would work like most other insurance 
plans; a policyholder will pay a premium to insure her 
property against harm.  Like other forms of insurance, 
the insured will determine the value112 of her property, 
and insure it for a sum that does not exceed that 
amount.  When the insured object is damaged, the 
policyholder files a claim with the insurance company, 
who then compensates her for her loss.  In a copyright 
insurance policy, the content producer will primarily 
insure against infringement,113 and will accordingly file 
a claim whenever its work is infringed.  It is important 
to note, though, that under this system, the insured, not 
the insurer, bears the responsibility of discovering and 
reporting infringing uses.114  
Also, the content producer will always be 
compensated for the harm caused by the infringement, 
111.  See id.  
112.  A simple Google search for “copyright valuation” yields 
a list of several firms that specialize in this service.  
113.  However, the policy could also be extended to cover 
theft, abandonment, etc.
114.  The burden of discovering infringing works is not 
significant.  A Google search for one’s copyrighted property will 
often yield many infringing uses.  Also, content creators will 
normally have networks of colleagues and fans that will notify them 
of unauthorized uses.   
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up to the amount it has insured against.  For example, 
if the work was insured for ten-thousand dollars, the 
insurance company will pay up to ten-thousand dollars 
for any infringement of that work.  Accordingly, an 
infringement of that work worth five-thousand dollars 
will yield five-thousand dollar payment from the 
insurer.  Conversely, if the infringement caused harm 
in excess of ten-thousand dollars, the owner would be 
entitled to pursue the infringer for the remainder of the 
damage.  
Copyright insurance offers security from 
infringers while leaving the owner’s copyright intact, 
and completely within her control.  While the insurance 
policy allows the owner to be compensated for her 
harm without self-help or the legal system, it does not 
destroy her ability to use these mechanisms to enforce 
her rights.  Although the insurance policy will often be 
the cheapest and most effective method for the owner 
to receive compensation, it does not obligate her to 
forego her other rights. 
  
2. Copyright Insurance for Insurance 
Providers
A copyright insurance provider will operate 
by collecting premiums from its policyholders, paying 
claims for infringement damages, and then suing 
infringers.  The insurance provider will have standing 
to sue for infringement because once it compensates 
a policyholder for its injuries, it will acquire the legal 
right to sue the offending party through the doctrine 
of subrogation.115  As a legally sophisticated entity, the 
insurance provider will be able to use its resources and 
expertise to add credibility to its enforcement efforts 
in a way that a private individual could not, and in 
a way that will deter potential infringers from their 
illegal activities.  Further, by collecting premiums 
from policyholders, the provider will insure that it 
has ample resources with which to pursue infringers, 
and sufficient funds to compensate instances of 
infringement.  
First, when a policyholder’s insured property 
is infringed, the insurance provider will evaluate 
115.  In re Hamada, 291 F.3d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In 
general terms, subrogation is the substitution of one party in place 
of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right.  It 
is a derivative right, acquired by satisfaction of the loss or claim 
that a third party has against another.  Subrogation places the party 
paying the loss or claim (the “subrogee”) in the shoes of the person 
who suffered the loss (“the subrogor”).  Thus, when the doctrine of 
subrogation applies, the subrogee succeeds to the legal rights and 
claims of the subrogor with respect to the loss or claim.”); see also 
Mutual Servs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601, 
629 (7th Cir. 2001).  
the cost of the infringement, and then compensate 
the policyholder according to the terms of the 
policy.  However, before a copyright is insured, it 
will be appraised, just like any other piece of insured 
property.  This will insure that the amount paid by the 
provider will reflect the actual damage caused by the 
infringement, including damage to value, actual and 
potential sales, reputation, and potential licensing deals. 
Second, once the insurance provider has fully 
compensated the policy owner, it will be free to sue the 
infringer to recover the amount it paid to its insured.  
Because insurance providers typically have greater 
bargaining power than individuals, and because the 
insurance provider, and not the content producer, will 
bring suit, the infringer will have greater incentive to 
settle the case.  Just as NPEs in patent law provide 
bargaining power and capital to independent inventors, 
copyright insurance providers will lend similar 
credibility to their clients.  
Furthermore, not every instance of 
infringement will result in a lawsuit.  Often, online 
copyright infringement is not worth the cost of a 
lawsuit,116 and would be dealt with outside of court.  
However, because an infringer would receive a “cease 
and desist” letter from an organization rather than an 
individual, it would have greater incentive to stop its 
infringing behavior.  From the provider’s point of view, 
a takedown notice, even without a settlement, will be a 
valuable tool because it will prevent future infringing 
uses, which will in turn lower the number of future 
claims it must pay.  
Ultimately, the insurance provider, with 
the very credible threat of litigation it presents to 
infringers, will be able to control infringement more 
efficiently than an individual could.  Based on the value 
of the copyright and the amount of damage caused by 
the infringement, the insurance provider would be able 
to determine whether to use litigation, negotiation, or a 
simple takedown request.  
B. Copyright Insurance is the Best 
Solution to Online Infringement, and 
the Most Effective Model for an NPE 
in Copyright Law
Copyright insurance will solve the problem 
of expensive and inaccessible copyright enforcement 
116.  See, e.g., Danny Bradbury, The Oatmeal beat FunnyJunk, 
but other cartoonists aren’t so lucky, guArdIAn (June 21, 2012, 1:55 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/21/oatmeal-
carreon-comics-property (noting that the highest paid online 
cartoonists make about $108 per day.  Additionally, litigation can 
cost as much as two to three-thousand dollars per day.).  
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mechanisms by allowing infringement claims to be 
prosecuted by organizations with the means to do so, 
and by giving producers an immediate and adequate 
remedy.  It offers an alternative to the status quo, which 
is more efficient, more equitable, and more consistent 
with other areas of the law.  
1. Copyright Insurance is More Efficient 
than Traditional Enforcement
First, a copyright insurance program will 
incentivize the creation of new works by offering 
producers more ways to realize value from their 
property.  By guaranteeing payment for legitimate 
injuries, and by allowing sophisticated parties to 
prosecute claims of copyright infringement on behalf 
of their clients, copyright insurance will reduce 
the risk that harm caused by infringement will go 
uncompensated.  This means that producers will realize 
more value from their creations, and will in turn be 
motivated to produce more works.  
Furthermore, producers will spend less time 
trying to protect their works, and more time creating 
new works.  Just as NPEs in patent law allow inventors 
to continue to invent by taking care of the legal issues 
associated with the patent, so too will copyright 
insurance give producers more resources with which 
to create new works.  By allowing the producer to 
receive immediate compensation for her harm while the 
insurance provider addresses the legal issues involved 
in the infringement, the producer has more resources 
with which to create new works.  
Second, insurance companies will reduce 
instances of infringement because they, unlike their 
clients, have a bargaining position from which they 
can negotiate settlements.  Because most copyright 
infringements are not worth the cost of a trial,117 
and because most individuals cannot afford the cost 
of litigation,118 private efforts to halt infringement 
are often fruitless.  However, when a sophisticated 
organization with the ability to pursue litigation 
attempts to settle an infringement dispute outside of 
court, the infringer will more likely stop his illegal 
activity than when a private individual sends the same 
letter.  
Furthermore, because of their greater leverage 
and bargaining power, insurance providers will be 
able to stop infringement before litigation or even 
negotiations become necessary, which will ultimately 
lower the cost of enforcement.  Because action taken by 
117.  Id.  
118.  Id.  
an insurance provider will more likely stop offending 
activity, it is less likely that the dispute will grow to 
a size that will require litigation.  Accordingly, every 
party involved in the dispute, including the court and 
the taxpayers, will benefit from more efficiently settled 
conflicts.  
Third, copyright insurance will lower 
transaction costs in copyright enforcement by 
increasing certainty and stability in enforcement 
mechanisms.  Because content producers will know 
that they will be compensated for harm caused by 
infringement, they will work less to protect their 
property.  Rather, the insurance provider, to recover 
the value of its payments, will seek compensation from 
the infringer.  This is a more efficient system because, 
as between the insurer and the insured, the insurer 
is in the best position to, and can most cheaply seek 
redress for the harm.  The insurer, because its business 
will be enforcing copyrights, will be able to navigate 
all aspects of the dispute resolution process more 
efficiently and cheaply than could a private individual.  
Finally, insurance providers will be better able 
to determine which instances of infringement will be 
worth litigating than private individuals.  Just like 
NPEs in patent law, insurance providers will decide 
to pursue claims based primarily on the likelihood of 
success, and will accordingly litigate only meritorious 
claims.119  In contrast, when individuals file suit, their 
decisions are often colored by emotion,120 and the 
perceived inequities of the situation.121  The result is a 
court system burdened by frivolous claims.  However, 
by preventing meritless and low value claims from 
being litigated, insurance providers will decrease the 
burden on the courts, and lower the average cost of 
litigation across the entire legal landscape.
  
2. Copyright Insurance is Consistent 
with Related Areas of Law, and 
an Appropriate Remedy for Mass 
Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement is an unfortunate 
reality of the online world.  While no one denies that 
such infringement is illegal, the fact remains that no 
one has been able to find an effective solution to the 
problem.122  However, by encouraging the development 
119.  See Risch, supra note 21, at 74.    
120.  Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 
46 hArv. c.L.-c.L.L. rev. 573 (2011).  
121.  Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from 
Law and Economics, 88 cAL. L. rev. 1135–36 (2000). 
122.  Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 1.  
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of copyright insurance, the copyright system would 
more accurately reflect the realities of the online world.  
Furthermore, by having infringement claims litigated 
by third parties, copyright practice would be more 
consistent with tort law practice and with the other 
subsets of intellectual property law.  
First, the copyright system is notorious for its 
inability to evolve at the same speed as technology, 
and it must constantly be tweaked to prevent it from 
becoming entirely obsolete.123  By developing a 
copyright insurance system, the law would tacitly 
recognize that many content producers cannot afford 
to defend their property and that the Internet presents 
challenges to copyright law that are too big to be 
confronted by individuals.  Just as traditional tort 
law accepted that many parties who had legitimate 
grievances could not afford to seek redress through 
the courts, copyright law must recognize that many 
copyright owners cannot afford to use the courts to 
satisfy their claims.  By creating a copyright insurance 
system, many owners would receive compensation they 
otherwise would not, and the law would be better able 
to protect content producers’ intellectual property.  
Second, copyright insurance would increase 
the cohesion between copyright law and tort law, 
while maintaining its conformity to the other subsets 
of intellectual property law.  By allowing insurance 
providers to prosecute infringement for their clients, 
injured parties will not have to rely on their own, 
often limited, resources to get compensation for their 
injuries.  Accordingly, copyright law, just like tort 
law, will recognize that because insurance companies 
depend on litigation for a large part of their business, 
and because it is more difficult for individuals to be 
productive when they are involved in litigation, it is 
more efficient for insurance companies, rather than 
individuals, to litigate claims.  
Also, copyright insurance will require 
copyright owners to maintain and defend their property 
to some extent.  Because copyright owners will have to 
file a claim to be compensated for infringement, they 
will have to remain diligent in locating unauthorized 
uses of their property.  In patent124 and trademark125 
law—and even in traditional property law126—owners 
are also required to maintain their ownership interest in 
123.  Id.  
124.  The USPTO has a graduated fee structure for maintaining 
patents.  See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/
fee031913.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).   
125.  See, e.g., The Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior 
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1989).  
126.  See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 
1980).  
their property.  This is because the law seeks to reward 
productivity and industry, and to hold otherwise would 
result in waste, as owners would receive the benefit of 
legal protection with no duty in return.  In a copyright 
insurance system, this requirement will prevent unused 
and unwanted intellectual property from being enforced 
for illegitimate gain, as logic dictates that few resources 
will be used to defend something of little value. 
3. Copyright Insurance is More Equitable 
than the Current Enforcement 
Mechanisms
Copyright insurance will allow content 
producers to receive compensation for any instance 
of infringement, and will also preserve their ability 
to determine when and how they will enforce their 
rights.  Under the current system, copyright owners 
are rarely able to obtain a remedy for their injuries, or 
even to enforce their rights at all.127  However, because 
copyright insurance will always compensate an owner 
for his injury, more owners will recover for their harms, 
and, necessarily, more infringers will pay for the harm 
they cause.  The result is a more equitable copyright 
system where more injuries are compensated, and more 
defendants are held accountable for their actions.  
Furthermore, by requiring a copyright owner to 
file a claim in order to receive compensation, the owner 
retains complete control over which infringements 
will be prosecuted.  Because a copyright owner may 
not want to sue every infringer, such as people with 
disabilities, charitable organizations, or educational 
institutions, this requirement provides indirect 
protection to such parties, and allows the owner greater 
control of how others use his work.  In the Righthaven 
saga, for example, the media organizations that sold 
their rights suffered damage to their reputations when 
Righthaven’s aggressive tactics drew the attention of 
bloggers and news organizations.128  Here, though, a 
copyright owner could avoid such negative associations 
by allowing certain instances of infringement, or by 
seeking to resolve them privately before filing a claim 
with the insurance provider.  Regardless of the owner’s 
preferred enforcement mechanism, though, the end 
result is a dispute resolution system wherein content 
127.  Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: 
Legitimate Sites v. Parasites (Part I & II): Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, and the Internet H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (Mar. 14, 2011) (statement of 
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).  
128.  When Righthaven was still filing lawsuits, the Las Vegas 
Sun, and blogs such as TechDirt and Ars Technica, provided regular 
coverage and commentary on the proceedings.  
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producers have more control in how their rights are 
enforced, and where they are more likely to receive 
compensation for their harm. 
 
C. How Will Copyright Insurance Work?
Just as the theoretical underpinnings of 
and justifications for copyright insurance are fairly 
straightforward, so to is its application to real world 
situations.  In the introductory section of this Note 
involving the Matthew Inman and FunnyJunk, 
copyright insurance would have solved the problem 
quickly, effectively, and fairly, and it would have 
conferred a benefit on each party involved.  Mr. 
Inman would have received compensation for his 
injury, FunnyJunk would have saved the expense of 
an attorney, its attorney would have avoided personal 
humiliation and unwanted attention, the insurance 
company would have received premiums from Mr. 
Inman, and taxpayers would have been spared the 
expense of federal litigation.  
1. Copyright Insurance and The Oatmeal
When Mr. Inman first noticed that his works 
were being infringed, he used self-help in the form 
of a DMCA takedown notice to protect his property.  
With a simple copyright insurance policy, though, 
the dispute would have ended almost before it began.  
Mr. Inman could have filed a claim for copyright 
infringement rather than attempt to resolve the problem 
on his own.  He would have been compensated for 
the damage caused by the unauthorized posting, 
and the insurance company would have approached 
FunnyJunk about its infringing activity.  Faced with 
a demand from the insurance company, FunnyJunk 
would have been more diligent in its efforts to remove 
the infringing material, as continued violations would 
have almost certainly lead to litigation and a settlement 
demand.  Furthermore, because the owners of other 
material on FunnyJunk’s website would likely have 
copyright insurance, FunnyJunk would have more 
incentive to thoroughly police its site, as each instance 
of infringement would be more likely pursued by an 
insurance provider.  
Because the potential of a lawsuit by an 
insurance company would have made FunnyJunk 
police its site more diligently, Mr. Inman would not 
have felt the need to use public opinion in his fight to 
stop the unauthorized use of his work.  Accordingly, all 
of the charges leveled against Mr. Inman would have 
never been filed, and neither party would have born the 
expense of attorney’s fees and court costs.  Under the 
copyright insurance system, then, infringement disputes 
would be more likely to be resolved in their early 
stages, and the chances of such dramatic escalation 
would be greatly reduced.  
2. The Business Model for Copyright 
Insurance
Copyright insurance will benefit content 
producers, and will allow insurance companies to profit 
while doing so.  In addition to receiving premiums, 
insurance companies will, through subrogation, acquire 
the right to sue for infringement on behalf of their 
policyholders.  With two options for making a profit, 
both the insured and insurer will be in a better position 
than they would have been without the insurance 
policy.  
First, insurance companies will charge a 
premium that guarantees them a profit.  Policyholders 
will be able to buy as much or as little insurance as 
they need or want, which will affect the amount of the 
premium.  The insurance company will use the amount 
for which the copyright is insured in conjunction 
with the likelihood of infringement to calculate the 
premium.  The resulting payment will allow the 
insurance company to compensate the policyholder for 
each instance of infringement while still being able to 
make a profit.  
Once the insurance company pays the 
policyholder for its injury, it will acquire the legal 
right to seek compensation from the offending party.129  
Although this will not always result in litigation, if the 
infringement causes significant harm, the insurance 
company will be able to fully litigate the claim to 
receive the compensation it is entitled to.  Because 
copyright law will be a primary part of its business, 
it will be able to conduct the litigation more cheaply 
and more effectively than most.  Accordingly, the 
insurance company will be in a better position 
to settle claims, and will often be able to acquire 
adequate compensation without fully trying the case.  
Furthermore, even if the case is fully litigated, the 
insurance company will have a variety of remedies 
to choose from,130 including the option to recover 
attorneys’ fees,131 which means it will have a better 
chance of recovering its losses through the court.   
129.  See discussion supra note 115.  
130.  17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2006) (providing the remedies 
for copyright infringement include injunctions, attorney’s fees and 
injunction, costs, and damages as well as and profits).  
131.  Id. § 505.  
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Copyright insurance is pragmatic both in 
theory and in its application.  It provides content 
producers with an effective tool to fight copyright 
infringement, as well as a method through which 
to receive adequate compensation.  Copyright 
insurance also enables insurance companies to provide 
remedies to injured creators while still generating 
profits.  Furthermore, its accompanying economic 
incentives will encourage insurance companies to avail 
themselves of the court system only to pursue the worst 
offenders.  The result will be a simple system that 
efficiently and comprehensively solves the problem of 
online copyright infringement.  
III. crItIcIsms oF coPYrIght InsurAnce
Copyright insurance provides an effective, 
efficient, and affordable solution to mass copyright 
infringement.  Granted, critics of this concept 
argue that the fair use doctrine will make copyright 
insurance ineffective, that insurance providers will 
coerce settlement agreements, and that the owners 
will profit at the content providers’ expense.  Each 
criticism addresses a legitimate area of concern.  Still, 
while copyright insurance may have various negative 
consequences, the probability that they will occur is 
remote.  Even so, the benefit that will accrue to society 
under this program outweighs the criticisms presented.
A. The Fair Use Doctrine Will Not Render 
Copyright Insurance Ineffective
An argument that opponents could make is 
that the fair use doctrine renders it too difficult for 
insurance companies to predict copyright infringement 
and insure the content providers yet remain profitable 
organizations.  The fair use doctrine is an affirmative 
defense against a claim of copyright infringement.132  
For example, if charged with copyright infringement, 
a defendant may claim that, although he did use the 
work, his use was a “fair use” and, therefore, not an 
infringement.  Doing so would constitute an absolute 
defense against copyright infringement claims.133  One 
could argue that this, in turn, could render the program 
unprofitable and thus ineffective.
Although this argument demonstrates a 
valid flaw within the copyright insurance system, it 
is unlikely that this deficiency presents a significant 
132.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright 
Fair Use Option, 1978-2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549 (2008); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
133.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
handicap to the program.  Firstly, disputes between 
providers and policyholders over whether an infringing 
use is a fair use will be rare.  Secondly, fair use will not 
make copyright insurance unpredictable to the point 
of unprofitability. Thirdly, while fair use is considered 
a broad and vague area of copyright law, courts have 
already consistently applied this doctrine, enabling 
insurance companies to make informed decisions as 
to fair use.  Lastly, the perceived vagueness of fair 
use does not display enough risk factors to discourage 
insurance providers from entering the copy right 
insurance business.
To begin with, insurance providers are 
generally required by law to provide an explanation 
of the denial of a claim.134  A disgruntled policyholder 
would be able to provide outside counsel with the 
provider’s opinion of why the use was fair.  If the 
policyholder’s attorney agreed with the assessment of 
the fair use claim, the dispute would most likely be 
dropped.  Alternatively, if the provider’s explanation 
were deemed unacceptable, the policyholder would 
still have a right to pursue the infringer independent 
of the insurer, and, depending on the jurisdiction, 
may have the option to seek tort,135 contract,136 or 
statutory137 remedies against the provider for denying 
the claim in bad faith.  The provider’s potential liability 
is an incentive for it to handle claims fairly.  The 
policyholder’s ability to sue after his claim is denied 
also prevents insurance providers from exercising too 
much power over copyright litigation, and demonstrates 
that the copyright insurance program is feasible.  
Additionally, insurance providers regularly 
insure businesses against claims of copyright 
infringement as part of standard commercial general 
liability policy.138  Accordingly, there exists a 
134.  See, e.g., 215 ILL. comP. stAt. § 5/154.6(n).  (“Any of 
the following acts by a company . . . constitutes an improper claims 
practice . . . .  Failing in the case of the denial of a claim or the 
offer of a compromise settlement to promptly provide a reasonable 
and accurate explanation of the basis in the insurance policy or 
applicable law for such denial or compromise settlement.”).  
135.  See, e.g., Sanderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 
432, 435 (D. Colo. 1990) (citing Williams v. Farmers Insurance 
Group, Inc., 781 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1989)); see also id. (holding 
that the state’s insurance law did not preclude a common law action 
for bad faith claim denial).   
136.  See, e.g., Chamberlaine & Flowers, Inc. v. Smith 
Contracting, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 414, 417 (W. Va. 1986) (holding 
that failure to pay an insurance claim is nonfeasance, rather than 
misfeasance, and therefore a contractual claim).  
137.  See, e.g., mo. rev. stAt. § 375.420 (2012); 40 PA. cons. 
stAt. § 1171.5(10) (2012).
138.  The standard form commercial general liability policy, 
as provided by the Insurance Services Office, extends coverage for 
advertising injuries, which it defines as an “injury arising out of an 
offense committed during the policy period occurring in the course 
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significant body of relevant history and applicable 
case law.139  Using this data insurance companies 
could determine the likelihood of a given work being 
infringed, and furthermore the likelihood of that 
use being a fair use.  Incidentally, Professor Barton 
Beebe published an empirical study of fair use 
litigation in which he detailed the win rates of fair 
use defendants.140  Insurance providers, as statistic-
generating machines, should be capable of distilling 
the same elements Professor Beebe studied and 
reformulating them to fit their needs.  This would 
allow the companies to profitably predict fair use and 
reinforce the effectiveness of the copyright insurance 
program.  
Furthermore, despite the perception that 
the fair use doctrine is part of a broad and vague 
area of copyright law,141 courts have already applied 
this doctrine with consistency.142  The doctrine is 
uniformly applied to an extent that most judges 
discuss it formulaically and rather mechanically.143  
Accordingly, insurance providers could incorporate 
this data into their models that determine where to set 
their premiums.  Because they could make case-by-
case judgments of whether a use is fair, this insurance 
program will work.   
Finally, insurance providers would not be 
dissuaded from entering a copyright insurance market 
as they regularly insure products whose level of risk 
is difficult to predict on a case-by-case basis.144  For 
example, individuals regularly insure their cars against 
accidents, and their homes against floods, fires, and 
tornados.  At an individual level, the contingency 
insured against is extremely difficult to predict.  In 
contrast, by pooling145 clients and evaluating the risk 
in a large sample of individuals, the insurance provider 
is able to predict the average rate of risk.  In copyright 
of the named insured’s advertising activities, if the injury arises out 
of libel, slander, defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, 
unfair competition or infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”  
139.  See, e.g., Euroconcepts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 
378 F. App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2011); Delta Computer Corp. v. Frank, 
196 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 1999).
140.  Beebe, supra note 132.
141.  See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual 
Property and Public Values, 74 FordhAm L. rev. 423, 431 (2005).  
142.  Beebe, supra note 132, at 584 (noting that the outcomes 
of the first and fourth elements of the fair use test correspond with 
the outcome of the case 81.5% and 83.8% of the time, respectively). 
143.  Id. at 561.  
144.  stAtIstIcs, nAIc, http://www.naic.org/cipr_statistics.htm 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013).  
145.  Pooling refers to the practice of assessing the risk within 
a large group of products.  By determining the rate at which the 
contingency will occur within the group, the insurance provider is 
able set its premiums at a level that will guarantee profitability.  
insurance, this translates to insurance providers 
establishing a rate at which its clients will win or lose 
fair use arguments, and to the notion that an insurance 
program is feasible.  
Because there is data to show the probability 
of a successful fair use defense,146 insurance providers 
could calculate the amount of risk inherent in copyright 
insurance and will be able to plan accordingly. 
B. Copyright Insurance Providers Will 
Not Bully Fair Users Into Settlement 
Agreements
Another criticism of copyright insurance is 
that insurance providers will adopt the trollish tactics 
of Righthaven by bullying ill-equipped parties into 
costly settlement agreements.  Because the law does 
not prevent copyright owners from using aggressive 
tactics to protect their works, opponents of copyright 
insurance will argue that insurance providers will 
use their size and sophistication to unfairly negotiate 
settlement payments.  The insurance providers, in 
contrast to Righthaven, would have legal standing to 
sue,147 and as a result the threat of a lawsuit would be 
much more potent.  
First, copyright insurers are not likely to seek 
improper settlement agreements from legitimate users 
because they will only be able to pursue the claims 
that they have honored.  As the insurance company 
will have to pay its policyholder before it can acquire 
the right to sue,148 it will be incentivized to only 
pursue cases from which it can profit.  Accordingly, 
an insurance provider will not pursue infringers unless 
those infringers will be able to pay an amount that is 
greater than the cost of both the claim and the resources 
spent on the settlement or litigation efforts.  
The reason Righthaven pursued so many 
questionable claims is that it usually only had to pay 
the cost of demanding and negotiating the settlement.149 
If a defendant with a meritorious defense did not 
acquiesce, Righthaven could always dismiss the case 
and cut its losses.150  Because it did not have to invest 
146.  Beebe, supra note 132.    
147.  See discussion supra note 115.  
148.  Id.   
149.  In many cases, Righthaven simply had to pay the sixty-
five dollar fee to register its copyright in the infringed work, send a 
standard cease-and-desist letter to the infringer, and then negotiate 
a settlement.  See Steve Green, Attorneys Accuse Righthaven of 
Settlement Shakedown, LAs vegAs sun (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:50 AM),  
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/ 2010/oct/08/attorneys-accuse-
righthaven-settlement-shakedown.   
150.  Fed. r. cIv. P. 41(a)(1) (allowing a plaintiff to 
voluntarily dismiss an action).  Righthaven did this twenty-nine 
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significant resources into pursuing an infringer, like an 
insurance provider will have to do via payment of the 
claim, Righthaven was able to shake down potential 
infringers with little regard for the consequences of 
its acts.151  If it had been required to compensate its 
clients before it could pursue infringers, it is likely that 
Righthaven would have only sued users that caused 
legitimate harm.  
Second, copyright insurance providers will not 
adopt trollish tactics because they will want to maintain 
a good reputation with their clients and potential 
customers.  As business entities, insurance providers 
will compete with each other for market share.152  In 
addition to providing quality services, they will also 
have to gain and keep the trust of their customers.  
Judging by the almost universal hatred with which the 
judiciary and the general public view Righthaven,153 
few insurance providers, if any, will be willing to 
embark on a similar path.    
Third, as between the content producer and 
the content infringer, it is better for society that the law 
favors the producer.  The content producer invests her 
time, money, and creative energy into bringing new 
works into existence.  Conversely, the infringer merely 
redistributes the work of others for his own personal 
gain.  While high litigation costs deter the producer 
from protecting her intellectual property, they should 
be used instead to deter infringers from stealing others’ 
creative output.
  
C. Copyright Insurance Will Not Unfairly 
Benefit Insurance Providers and 
Content Producers at the Expense of 
Fair Users and Free Speech
Finally, opponents of copyright insurance argue 
times during its filing stint.  Most of the voluntary dismissals 
occurred in the last months of 2011.  For the complete list, see 
Comprehensive List of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Filed By 
Righthaven, LLC, rIghthAven LAwsuIts, http://righthavenlawsuits.
com/ lawsuits.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).  
151.  For example, Righthaven unknowingly sued an autistic 
blogger on a fixed income in early 2011.  See Righthaven, LLC v. 
Hill, No. 1:11-CV-00211 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2011).    
152.  Auto Insurance, Ins. InFo. Inst., http://www.iii.org/
facts_statistics/auto-insurance.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) 
(showing that in 2011, the market share controlled by the top ten 
private automobile insurers were, with one exception, within two 
percentage points of each other.  This indicates healthy competition 
in the industry).  
153.  See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground 
LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d. 968, 979 (D. Nev. 2011) (ordering 
Righthaven to show cause as to why it should be sanctioned for 
“flagrant misrepresentation” to the court).   A simple Google search 
for “Righthaven” yields a plethora of sites devoted criticizing the 
organization.  
that it will improperly benefit insurance providers and 
content producers at the expense of infringing fair 
users and free speech in general.  Because copyright 
insurance would give producers more effective ways 
to prevent their works from being infringed,154 it 
would necessarily increase a copier’s liability for 
infringement, and accordingly produce a “chilling 
effect” on the exchange of ideas and information.  As 
copyright exists to increase creative expression, such a 
system would run contrary to the fundamental values 
of copyright law, and of American jurisprudence in 
general.  
While this objection raises a legitimate concern 
as to the effect of copyright insurance on society as a 
whole, it is unlikely to cause significant problems, and, 
even if it does, the benefits of the program far outweigh 
its costs.  
First, it is doubtful that copyright insurance 
will have a significant chilling effect on the free 
exchange of information.  In fact, the law specifically 
exempts pure information from copyright protection.155  
Rather, only certain forms of expression may be 
copyrighted.156  For example, a newspaper article is 
protected under copyright law, but the underlying story 
cannot be copyrighted.157  Therefore, an insurance 
provider will only obtain the enforcement rights to a 
particular expression, not to the underlying content.  
These rights cannot be used to stifle the legitimate flow 
of ideas, only the illegitimate copying of protected 
expression.  
Second, copyright law incentivizes creativity 
by granting producers a limited monopoly over their 
works,158 and not by encouraging copiers to infringe 
with impunity.  Because copiers do not provide 
society with anything new, the law does not protect 
their activity, and further considers it as offense to 
content producers.159  Accordingly, although copyright 
insurance will undeniably decrease the amount of free 
information available to the public,160 it will only do so 
154.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1.    
155.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”) (emphasis 
added).
156.  Id. § 102(a).  
157.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 
(1918) (“In considering the general question of property in news 
matter, it is necessary to recognize its dual character, distinguishing 
between the substance of the information and the particular form or 
collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.”).  
158.  17 U.S.C. § 106.
159.  See id. § 501.  
160.  See supra pp. 5–8.  
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with the protected works that would not have been free 
but for their infringement.  
Third, even if legitimate users of copyrighted 
materials are harmed by copyright insurance, the 
increased incentive to create new works provided by 
insurance will yield a net benefit to society.  Currently, 
because enforcing copyrights is so expensive,161 
unauthorized copiers operate at an advantage over 
producers.  They can infringe with impunity up to a 
certain point, knowing that their actions must cause 
a certain amount of harm before they will incite the 
owner to action.  However, by making copyrights 
easier to enforce, copyright insurance will give 
producers better footing in their fight against infringers, 
and essentially lower the threshold at which infringers 
operate.  Ultimately, because producers provide new 
works and ideas, and infringers merely freeload off of 
the producers, society will benefit if the producer is 
given more rights. 
concLusIon
Mass online copyright infringement remains 
a serious problem in the American economy.  While 
copyright owners have struggled to find effective 
enforcement mechanisms, their neighbors in patent 
law have found a mechanism by which they can 
efficiently protect their rights.  In patent law, third-
party enforcement via non-practicing entities has been 
an incredibly successful method for pulling value 
from patents, fighting infringement, and providing 
additional sources of capital for individual inventors.  
Accordingly, to acquire similar benefits, copyright 
law should annex the basic principle of third-party 
enforcement and transform it into copyright insurance.  
By developing a robust copyright insurance 
system, copyright owners would benefit from 
increased compensation for infringement, more value 
in their works, and the services of a sophisticated and 
professional organization for litigation.  Professional 
copyright enforcement would discourage would-
be infringers from their illegitimate activity, and 
thereby increase the profitability of content producers.  
Furthermore, copyright insurance is well suited 
to existing law, will have a minimum impact on 
legitimately fair uses of protected works, and will 
encourage, rather than stifle, the creation of new ideas.  
Overall, copyright insurance is the most equitable 
solution to the problem of mass online copyright 
infringement.  
161.  Am. InteLL. ProP. LAw Ass’n, supra note 37.  
